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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this action for divorce pursuant to UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-

4.5(2) (1998) violates article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution.
Standard of Review: The

trial

court's

conclusions

are

reviewed

for

correctness. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d991 (Utah 1995).
II.

Whether the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on three of the

elements necessary to establish a common law marriage.
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review. Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991).

III.

Whether the trial court erred in granting the petition to modify the

original decree of divorce based on a change of circumstances, while at the same time
finding that the parties had been married pursuant to the common law marriage
statute.
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling on questions of law is reviewed
under the correction error standard. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994).
IV.

Whether there was a basis for the trial court's award of temporary

alimony and child support.
Standard of Review: The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness and given no special deference on appeal. Howell 806 P.2d 1209.
V.

Whether the trial court's findings of fact supporting its alimony award

are adequate and whether they are supported by sufficient evidence.
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209.
VI.

Whether the trial court's findings of fact support its award of attorneys'

fees.
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact in awarding attorneys'
fees are sufficient is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Rehn v. Rehn,
91A P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999).
VII.

Whether the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on contempt

supported the trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that
Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay the ordered amounts of child support, alimony,
and marital debt.
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES
The following constitutional provision and statutes bear on the issues of this
case:
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24:
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1998), which provides:
(1)
A marriage which is not solemnized according to this
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties
who:
(a)
are capable of giving consent;
(b)
are legally capable of entering a solemnized
marriage under the provisions of this chapter;
(c)
have cohabited;
(d)
mutually assume marital rights, duties, and
obligations; and
(e)
who hold themselves out as and have acquired a
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2)
The determination or establishment of a marriage under
this section must occur during the relationship described in Subsection
(1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship.
Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be
manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules
of evidence as facts in other cases.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1999), which provides in pertinent part:
(7)
(a)
The court shall consider at least the following factors in
determining alimony:
(i)
the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii)
the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce
income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v)
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
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(vi)

whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned
or operated by the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse
to attend school during the marriage.
The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining

(b)
alimony.
(c)
As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with
Subsection (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of
living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no
children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d)
The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(h)
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the
number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify
the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below
Petitioner/appellee Sonia Kelley and respondent/appellant Wayne Kelley were
originally divorced in 1994. In 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a motion to set aside the
decree of divorce (June 14, 1996), a motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction (June 14, 1996), a petition to modify the decree of divorce
(July 10, 1996), and a divorce complaint (July 10, 1996). In 1997, Sonia Kelley filed
a separate action alleging fraud, which was later consolidated with the divorce
proceedings.
This matter came before the trial court on three separate legal claims:
(1)

the claim that fraud had taken place in connection with the

parties' divorce in 1994;
4

(2)

the claim that the parties had entered into a common law

marriage after their divorce in 1994; and
(3)

a claim that the 1994 decree of divorce should be modified based

on a change in circumstances.
In 1997, Wayne Kelley filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to
the common law marriage theory, because no determination that a marriage had taken
place occurred within one year of the termination of the parties' relationship as
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998). The trial court ruled that the oneyear requirement set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) was
unconstitutional.
At trial, the trial court found that a common law marriage existed and that the
petition to modify the original decree of divorce should be granted. The trial court
dismissed the complaint seeking relief on the basis of fraud. The trial court made
awards of alimony and child support, divided property, and awarded attorneys' fees.
In June of 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Wayne Kelley was in contempt of the court's orders requiring that he pay
alimony, child support, and marital debt. The trial court entered a finding of contempt
and ordered Wayne Kelley to take certain actions or face a fine and imprisonment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sonia Kelley and Wayne Kelley were married on May 24, 1980. They have
two children: Christopher, who was born in 1985, and Erin, who was born in 1990.
(Findings of Facts Nos. 1 and 2; R. at 1660.)
During the parties' marriage, Wayne Kelley worked in construction.
Originally, he founded and owned Altex Construction. In 1990, DSI was created.
Wayne Kelley owned 55% of DSI's stock.
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That company was involved in the

construction and modification of government facilities throughout the world.
(Findings of Facts Nos. 3 and 4; R. at 1660.)
In 1993 and 1994, DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies. Those
companies were in financial distress at the time.

DSI took over the Mathews

Companies, so that the companies could perform under the various contracts in which
DSI was involved. (Finding of Fact No. 6, R. at 1660-61.)
The transactions with the Mathews Companies required that Wayne Kelley
individually sign and guarantee bonds for the Mathews Companies' performance,
which would expose his personal assets to considerable risk. The trial court found
that the parties agreed to enter into a divorce, so that their home could be protected
from creditors. The trial court found, although this was disputed by Wayne Kelley,
that Wayne Kelley told Sonia Kelley the parties would not be separated and nothing
would change from how they had lived in the past. (Finding of Fact No. 9, R. at
1661.)
In the spring and summer of 1994, the parties agreed to and entered into a
stipulation, which resulted in a divorce decree being entered on July 18, 1994. Under
the decree, Sonia Kelley was awarded custody of the parties' children, the house and
furnishings, alimony, and child support, and Wayne Kelley was awarded his stock in
DSI and the parties' investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. (Finding of Fact
No. 12, R. at 1661.) Wayne Kelley was to pay all debts up to June of 1994. The
decree of divorce recited that Wayne Kelley lived and worked in Texas. (R. at 32,

15.)
After the decree of divorce was entered, Wayne Kelley spent the majority of
his time in Texas. However, when he would come to Utah, he would sometimes stay
at Sonia Kelley's home. Exhibit 4 indicated that Wayne Kelley spent 58 days at Sonia
Kelley's home in 1994, 63 days in 1995, and 16 days in 1996. (Vol. Ill, tr. p. 128.)
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From 1994 until the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley continued to provide substantial
financial support to Sonia Kelley.
During 1994 and 1995, and into 1996, Wayne Kelley lived with another
woman in Texas. Sonia Kelley testified that she learned of this in 1995, and in fact,
spoke to the other woman, Theresa Turner, by telephone on several occasions. (R. at
1722, tr. pp. 93-94.)
In May of 1996, there was an altercation between the parties, resulting from a
visitation dispute, which resulted in the police being called and criminal charges being
filed. Thereafter, Sonia Kelley filed these proceedings.
At the time of the divorce in 1994, Wayne Kelley was receiving $8,000 per
month as a draw from DSI and a distribution from the Kodiak property of $10,000 per
month. He continued to pay substantial amounts to Sonia Kelley to allow her to make
the mortgage payments and to make payment on the parties' debts, which he had been
ordered to pay.
The original pleadings that Sonia Kelley filed in June of 1996, a motion for
restraining order and preliminary injunction, were aimed at tying up the proceeds of a
settlement of a lawsuit between DSI and its bonding company. (R. at 50-51.)
In June of 1999, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Wayne Kelley was in contempt based on his failure to pay all of the alimony,
child support, and marital debt ordered by the court. The trial court entered a finding
of contempt and imposed punishment on Wayne Kelley. The punishment was stayed
pending Wayne Kelley's performance of certain actions.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court incorrectly held that UTAH CODE ANN. $30-1-4.5(2)

violates article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution.
The statute at issue does not create a classification other than the classification
created by any time limitation. In addition, even if a classification is found, the statute
at issue has a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the legislature and is
therefore constitutional.
II.

The trial court failed to make sufficient findings on three of the elements

required to establish a common law marriage.
The trial court in this case failed to deal with the requirements of cohabitation,
in light of the fact that Wayne Kelley lived in Texas with another woman, the fact that
Wayne Kelley did not consent to be married, and the fact that the parties did not have
a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
III.

The trial court erred in granting the petition to modify the original

divorce decree based on a change of circumstances, because the trial court found that
the parties were married pursuant to the common law marriage statute.
Although the trial court retains continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree of
divorce, the decree of divorce is no longer in effect if the parties remarry. In this case,
since the court found that the parties were remarried pursuant to the common law
marriage statute, it should not have modified the original decree of divorce.
IV.

There was no basis for the trial court's award of temporary alimony and

child support.
Since the parties were not married pursuant to the common law marriage
statute, the trial court could not properly award temporary alimony and child support.
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V.

The trial court's findings of fact supporting its alimony award are not

adequate and are not supported by sufficient evidence.
The trial court found that Wayne Kelley's income was $10,000 per month.
There was no evidence Wayne Kelley was currently receiving $10,000 per month or
had the ability to receive that income.

Moreover, the trial court did not make

sufficient findings as to the ability of Wayne Kelley to provide $5,000 per month in
total support.
VI.

The trial court's findings of fact do not support its award of attorneys9

fees.
The trial court ordered Wayne Kelley to pay attorneys' fees totaling more than
$35,000. Utah case law requires that the trial court make findings that Wayne Kelley
had the ability to pay those fees. In this case, the only finding as to Wayne Kelley's
ability to pay was the court's finding that he had $10,000 per month in income.
VII.

The evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on contempt did not

support the trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that
Wayne Kelley had the current ability to pay the ordered amounts of child support,
alimony, and marital debt.
The trial court held Wayne Kelley in contempt for failure to pay alimony, child
support, and marital debt. At the hearing, Wayne Kelley testified he had $6,000 per
month as income. The trial court found that he had the ability to produce $10,000 per
month as income. The finding was not supported by clear and convincing evidence,
and thus, the trial court should not have found Wayne Kelley in contempt.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Wayne and Sonia Kelley were divorced in July of 1994. During 1994 and until
the spring of 1996, they maintained a cordial relationship, which the trial court found
constituted a common law marriage. Although Wayne Kelley disputes that there was
a common law marriage and asserts that he was living in Texas, it is undisputed that,
until the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley occasionally stayed in Sonia Kelley's home
and provided substantial funds for the support of Sonia Kelley and his children.
However, it is also undisputed that, as of the spring of 1996, Wayne Kelley no
longer stayed at Sonia Kelley's home and had a home in Park City, Utah. (R. at 1722,
tr. p. 64.)
In the summer of 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a variety of different pleadings on
different legal theories. In June of 1996, she filed a motion to set aside the divorce
decree entered in 1994. In July of 1996, she filed a divorce complaint, alleging in the
alternative that the decree of divorce entered in July of 1994 was void or that the
parties were married pursuant to the common law marriage statute.
In August of 1997, Wayne Kelley filed a motion to dismiss and for partial
summary judgment on the grounds that Sonia Kelley had not met the requirement set
forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998), that a determination of common law
marriage take place within one year after termination of the relationship.
The motion was initially heard by Commissioner Dillon, who denied it.
Commissioner Dillon held that Judge Allphin had made an adjudication of common
law marriage by inference in October of 1996.

Wayne Kelley objected to the

commissioner's recommendation.
On January 28, 1998, Judge Page entered a written ruling on the objection to
the commissioner's recommendation. (Addendum A, R. at 1172-95.) In his ruling,
10

Judge Page made findings of fact and held that: (1) Commissioner Dillon's
recommendation should be overruled, as far as it concerned the prior adjudication of
common law marriage; (2) Wayne Kelley was not estopped to raise the time bar
because of his resistance to discovery; and (3) UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1998)
was not unconstitutional under the open courts provision of article I, § 11, of the Utah
Constitution.
However, the trial court held that subsection 2 of the common law marriage
statute violated article I, § 24, of the Utah Constitution, which provides: "All laws of
a general nature shall have uniform operation." The trial court reasoned that article I,
§ 24, is analogous to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. To be constitutional under § 24, the trial court said, a law
must not only be uniform on its face, but also operate uniformly.
The trial court then considered what level of review was applicable. Because
the right at issue was in the nature of an economic or social interest, the trial court
said, the court should employ a "rational basis" analysis. The trial court was then
required to consider whether: (1) the law applies equally to all persons within a class,
and (2) the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Warren v. Melville,
937 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah App. 1997).
The trial court found that the operation of the one-year time bar set forth in
subsection 2 created two opposing subclasses from a larger class that was originally
similarly situated. The trial court said that one class consisted of persons unable to
obtain a judicial determination of common law marriage within one year, and the
other class consisted of persons able to obtain a determination within one year.
The trial court indicated that, in its opinion, a party might be unable to obtain a
determination of common law marriage within one year after the termination of the
relationship. As a practical matter, the trial court said, parties might deliberately delay
11

the determination, or the caseload of the court might not allow for a determination
within the one year. The trial court also indicated its belief that the time limit set forth
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) is extremely unusual. The trial court noted
that there is little legislative history for the common law marriage statute, but
speculated "that the legislature may have been attempting to limit the time for action
for the same reason as with other 'statutes of limitations,' for want of a better word."
(R. at 1192,11.3-4.)
The trial court then applied the rational basis test to the two classifications
created by the statute. The trial court opined that no rational basis could be found for
the discrimination between persons able to obtain a determination within one year and
persons who are not. The trial court then found that the one-year provision was
severable from the remainder of the statute, and that the court should proceed to
determine whether a common law marriage existed, based on the facts of this case.
The trial court did not offer any opinion as to whether any time limitation of any kind
applied to the common law marriage statute.
In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), the Court considered the
constitutionality of the guest statute. In considering whether the guest statute violated
article I, § 24, the Court said:
Whether a statute meets equal protection standards depends in the
first instance upon the objectives of the statute and whether the
classifications established provide a reasonable basis for promoting
those objectives. . . .
Article I, § 24 protects against two types of discrimination. First,
a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the
statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes
must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further
the objectives of the statute.
693 P.2d at 670. (Citations omitted.)

12

The purpose of the common law marriage statute was to save public funds by
curbing welfare abuse. David F. Crabtree, Recognition of Common Law Marriages,
1988 UTAH L. REV. 273. The legislature was apparently concerned that a person
living in a household might be providing support that would not be considered in
determining welfare eligibility. Id.
In Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1995), the Court considered a
common law marriage claim.

The parties had separated in August of 1990, a'

complaint was filed in May of 1991, but there was no determination of the
relationship within one year of the parties' separation. The Court of Appeals held that
the filing of complaint was not adequate and a determination must occur within the
one-year period to meet the requirements of the statute.
Appellant in Bunch had argued that the one-year provision was unconstitutional
under article I, §§ 7 and 11, of the Utah Constitution. However, the Court did not
reach that issue because the constitutional claims had not been asserted in the trial
court.

Likewise, in Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998), a

constitutional challenge had been raised, but was not considered by the Court, because
it disposed of the case on other grounds. The Court noted that a constitutional
question might be raised if the trial court entered a judgment denying a common law
marriage within one year of separation and the judgment were reversed on appeal.
958 P.2d at 937, fn. 2, citing Bunch, 906 P.2d 918.
Subsection 2 of § 30-1-4.5 functions in part as a statute of limitations. The
Utah courts have repeatedly noted that the legislature has great latitude to fix
limitation periods. In Avis v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584
(Utah App. 1992), the applicable statute of limitations under the Worker's
Compensation Act was challenged on the grounds that it violated the open courts
provision, article I, § 11, Utah Constitution, and uniform operation section, article I,
§ 24. With respect to equal protection, the petitioner in Avis argued that restricting
13

injured workers from bringing claims for permanent partial disability after the statute
of limitations has run, unlawfully discriminated against workers who had not been
rated before the statute of limitations ran.

The Court held that the statute of

limitations at issue did not violate article I, § 24, because all injured workers were
subject to the same time limitations. In addition, the Court said, limiting the claim
period for workers bore a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate
legislative purpose—protecting employers and the State of Utah Second Injury Fund
from having to defend stale claims. 837 P.2d at 588.
The Court in Avis noted that statutes of limitations are presumptively
constitutional, although courts had recognized exceptions when a statute operated
harshly in cases where an injured person had no way of knowing that the injury had
occurred until after the statute had run. That exception does not apply to common law
marriage claims.
In Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), the Court considered the issue of
whether statutes of limitations and repose for medical malpractice actions were
unconstitutional when applied to minors. In Lee, the Court said:
The fixing of a limitations period is highly judgmental and is
determined by the Legislature's weighing a number of general policies,
such as whether particular types of cases require speedy resolution, the
nature of the evidence typically used in litigating a particular type of
case, the consequences to putative plaintiffs, defendants, and third
persons who might be affected by the litigation, and the interest of
society at large in not leaving disputes unresolved for long periods of
time.
Id. at 575. The Court noted that the legislature could fix different limitations periods
for different causes of action without violating the Utah Constitution. Id.
In Lee, the Court held that the right to bring a malpractice action was protected
by article I, § 11, the open courts provision, resulting in a higher level of scrutiny
under article I, § 24. The Court also said that the legislature's rationale for the
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medical malpractice statute of limitations and repose as applied to minors was not
supported by empirical evidence. The Court said: "The legislative means for solving
the insurance problem by cutting off the malpractice claims of minors simply does not
further the legislative objective."

Id. at 588.

Thus, the Court said, under the

heightened level of scrutiny, the medical malpractice statute of limitations and the
statute of repose, as applied to minors, were unconstitutional.
The reasoning of Lee is not applicable in this case. First, the rights of minors
are not implicated. The Lee court indicated that it gave special protection to the rights
of children. Second, the right to a finding of common law marriage is not a right
protected by the open courts provision. The open courts provision generally protects
rights to recover for personal injury or common law remedies that existed at the time
of Utah statehood. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996).
Thus, the classification in this case must only meet the rational basis test. The
question is whether the statute has a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of
the legislature.
The rationale for requiring that a determination of common law marriage take
place quickly is obvious. Whether a person is or has been married is fundamental to
all of his social and economic decisions. The legislature obviously wanted to prevent
long drawn-out proceedings, adjudication of stale claims, and the harm that would
result to families from not knowing whether a marriage existed or not. Thus, the
classification the trial court found to exist clearly serves the legislative purpose and
tends to further the objectives of the statute—a timely adjudication of whether a
common law marriage exists.
Moreover, the trial court mistakenly found that the statute creates two
classifications. Every statute of limitations, under the trial court's analysis, creates
two classifications of persons, those who file within the time limit required and those
who do not. In fact, there is really only one classification of persons existing here;
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those who claim a common law marriage existed. All of these persons are treated the
same under the statute.
In Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995), the Court
noted that its function is to examine the reasonableness of a classification in light of
legislative objectives. In that case, the Court held that the legislature had created a
class of tort defendants who were treated differently from other tort defendants. The
Court said it would sustain the legislative classification if it could reasonably conceive
of facts that would justify the classification and if the legislature chose a reasonable
means to achieve its objectives. The Court found that the statute at issue met these
requirements and held the statute constitutional.
In this case, the trial court incorrectly found that the statute had created a
classification.

However, even if a classification existed, a legitimate legislative

purpose existed for the classification—prevention of stale claims and avoiding drawnout proceedings to determine whether common law marriages exist. The one-year
time requirement is a reasonable means to achieve those objectives. Because the oneyear requirement is reasonable and therefore justifiable in light of the legislative
objectives, the trial court erred when it found the statute unconstitutional.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT
FINDINGS ON THREE OF THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED
TO ESTABLISH A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE.

In Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), the Court held that, in order to
establish a common law marriage, a claimant must prove each of six different
elements:
(1)

a contract between two consenting parties;

(2)

who are capable of giving consent;

(3)

who are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under

the provisions of this chapter;
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(4)

who have cohabited;

(5)

who have mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and

obligations; and
(6)

who hold themselves out and have acquired a uniform and

general reputation as husband and wife.
The Court said in Whyte:
No single factor is determinative. Evidence of each element is essential.
Consenting parties must show cohabitation, assumption of marital rights
and duties, a general reputation as husband and wife, capacity to marry,
and capacity to give consent. Often these five elements . . . can be
proved or disproved with relative ease. However, whether the parties
consented to be married is often disputed.
Id at 794.
In this case, the trial court made extensive findings, based on Sonia Kelley's
testimony and the testimony of the parties' neighbors in Bountiful, Utah, that the
parties' relationship did not change after their divorce in July of 1994. The trial court
said that the parties continued to live as they had prior to the divorce. (Finding of Fact
No. 17, R. at 1664.) The trial court also relied on an anniversary card Wayne Kelley
had sent to Sonia Kelley in 1995, and the fact that they traveled to Mexico together.
(Findings of Fact Nos. 20 and 21, R. at 1664-65.)
However, the trial court ignored certain undisputed facts. The original decree
of divorce entered in 1994 recited that Wayne Kelley was living and working in
Texas. In 1994, Wayne Kelley had an apartment in Texas, where he was living with
another woman, Theresa Turner. Wayne Kelley spent the substantial majority of his
time in Texas, returning to Sonia Kelley's home to visit. In 1994, Wayne Kelley spent
only 58 days in Utah, in 1995, 64 days, and in 1996, only 16 days at the marital home.
According to Wayne Kelley's testimony, the amount of time he spent in Utah
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decreased substantially after the divorce, and occasionally, when he came to Utah, he
stayed in hotels. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 128-29.)
In order to establish that the parties had a uniform and general reputation as
husband and wife, Sonia Kelley presented the testimony of a number of her neighbors
in Bountiful, Utah, who did not know that the parties were divorced. However, one of
those neighbors, Jan Michael, testified that she learned of Wayne Kelley's relationship
with another woman when Sonia told her about it in September of 1995. (R. at 1723,
tr. p. 19.) Sonia Kelley admitted that she had spoken to Ms. Turner on the telephone
in 1995, and had even called Ms. Turner's mother to inquire whether Mr. Kelley and
Ms. Turner had been married. (R. at 1722, tr. pp. 94-5.)
There was clearly evidence, although disputed by Wayne Kelley, on which the
trial court could base findings that the parties continued to act as if they were husband
and wife during the limited time that Wayne Kelley was in Bountiful, Utah However,
the trial court made no findings to deal with the fact that Wayne Kelley was actually
living with another woman in the state of Texas.
Utah appellate courts have not considered the definition of cohabitation in the
context of the common law marriage statute. However, the Court of Appeals has
considered the definition of cohabitation in the context of alimony termination. In that
context, the Court of Appeals has said that cohabitation is comprised of two elements:
common residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association. Haddow v.
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). In this case, although Wayne Kelley disputed the
testimony, Sonia Kelley testified that the two had continuing sexual contact. Even if
all of Ms. Kelley's testimony is accepted, however, the facts that Wayne Kelley spent
the vast majority of his time living in his apartment in Texas, and that he was residing
there with another woman, negates any implication that the parties were residing
together.
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In Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995), the Court said: "Common
residency means 'the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their
principal domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 917.
(Citations omitted.) During the time period at issue, Wayne Kelley resided only
temporarily in Utah.
In addition, the Court in Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, made it clear that a finding of
common law marriage requires that the parties have a uniform and general reputation
as husband and wife. In this case, while Sonia Kelley was able to present evidence
that her neighbors did not know of the divorce, she presented no evidence that Wayne
Kelley's friends or business associates believed the parties to be married. In fact,
there was substantial, unrefiited evidence to the contrary. Theresa Turner, the woman
with whom Wayne Kelley had lived in Texas, testified that she went out to dinner
with Wayne Kelley's business associates, clients, and friends in Texas, and that they
were aware that he was divorced from Sonia Kelley. Rosalee Kelley, Wayne Kelley's
mother, testified that Sonia Kelley discussed with her the fact that the parties were
divorced. Rosalee Kelley was also aware that Wayne Kelley was living with another
woman and discussed that fact with Sonia Kelley.

Sam Baker, Wayne Kelley's

longtime lawyer and friend, testified that he had gone out to dinner with Wayne
Kelley and Theresa Turner and was aware of the divorce. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 93-4.)
Based on the foregoing, the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on
three essential elements required to be proved to establish a common law marriage:
(1)

The trial court did not deal with the issue of whether the parties

were cohabiting when Wayne Kelley had another home in the state of Texas,
where he lived with another woman the majority of the time.
(2)

The trial court did not deal with Wayne Kelley's lack of consent

to be married. Sonia Kelley obviously knew that Wayne Kelley was living
with another woman, and in fact, made inquiries as to whether he intended to
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marry the other woman, negating the notion that she thought Wayne Kelley had
consented to be married to her.
(3)

The only evidence that the parties had a uniform and general

reputation as husband and wife came from the testimony of their neighbors in
Bountiful, Utah. Obviously, the people that Wayne Kelley associated with in
his home in the state of Texas did not believe that he was married to Sonia
Kelley.
Because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings on these three
elements, its conclusion that a common law marriage existed was in error.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION TO MODIFY THE ORIGINAL DIVORCE
DECREE BASED ON A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES,
WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FINDING THAT THE
PARTIES HAD BEEN MARRIED PURSUANT TO THE
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE STATUTE.

In 1996, Sonia Kelley filed a petition to modify the divorce decree entered in
July of 1994, claiming that there had been a change of circumstances since the entry
of the original decree. The petition to modify essentially alleged that a change in
circumstances had occurred, because Wayne Kelley was no longer paying an amount
in excess of the amount ordered by the decree of divorce to Sonia Kelley for her
support. (Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, R. at 122, ^f 8.) In addition, the
petition to modify contained allegations that Wayne Kelley misled Sonia Kelley as to
the financial situation at the time of the divorce. (R. at 123, ^f 12.)
In Bayles v. Bayles, 367 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1999), the Court of
Appeals held that a petition to modify was not the proper way to pursue a fraud claim.
In Bayles, the Court said that fraud was not a change of circumstances that would
justify a modification of the decree, and a person seeking relief on that basis must file
an independent action for fraud.
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In this case, Sonia Kelley did file an independent action for fraud, which was
later consolidated with the divorce complaint. Thus, the allegations of fraud could not
provide the basis for the trial court's granting of the petition to modify. Moreover, the
trial court specifically found that no fraud had taken place. (Finding of Fact No. 26,
R. at 1665.)
The trial court in this case found a change of circumstances based on the
termination of Wayne Kelley's financial support of Sonia Kelley. (Conclusions of
Law Nos. 4 and 5, R. at 1671.) Based on that change of circumstances and based on
the common law marriage, the trial court modified the terms of the original decree of
divorce.
In this case, in effect, the trial court at the same time held that the parties were
married and not married. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1999), the court
has continuing jurisdiction to make changes in a divorce decree.

However, the

divorce decree is presumably no longer in force if the parties are married.
In Whyte, 885 P.2d 791, one of the issues was whether, under common law
marriage statute, Whyte was married to Mitchell, the holder of an automobile
insurance policy, at the time of his accident. If a marriage existed, Whyte would be
covered under the policy as a member of Mitchell's family. The trial court had ruled
that the marriage was not valid until a court or administrative order had been entered,
and that Whyte and Mitchell could not therefore have been married at the time of the
accident. On appeal, the Court said: "The issue is whether Utah Code Ann. § 30-14.5 permits an order to establish that a lawful marriage existed prior to the entry of the
order." 885 P.2d at 793. The Supreme Court held that the trial court could enter an
order recognizing a lawful marriage that began before the order was entered and
remanded to the trial court to determine whether a valid marriage existed at the time
of the accident.
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In this case, it is obvious that the trial court found that a common law marriage
existed from the time of the parties' divorce in 1994. In fact, the trial court awarded
alimony for a period of sixteen years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (Supp. 1999)
provides that alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
years that the marriage existed, unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.

In this case, since the trial court made no findings of

extenuating circumstances, it must have combined the length of the solemnized and
common law marriages in order to award alimony for sixteen years.
Based on the trial court's apparent finding that the parties were married from
1994 to 1996, the decree of divorce that ended the marriage in 1994 should not have
been modified.

Once the parties were married again, the decree was no longer

effective. Thus, the trial court erred in modifying that decree of divorce.
IV.

THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S
AWARD OF TEMPORARY ALIMONY AND CHILD
SUPPORT.

In 1996, the trial court in this case entered an order requiring that Wayne
Kelley pay Sonia Kelley temporary alimony and child support totaling $6,000 per
month. The trial court did not explain the basis for that award, since no specific
finding of a common law marriage had been made, and the 1994 decree awarded
different amounts of alimony and child support.
After the trial in this matter, the trial court retroactively modified the award of
temporary alimony and child support. Apparently, the basis for the temporary award,
as modified by the trial court, was the trial court's finding of common law marriage.
As indicated in this brief, the trial court erred in finding that common law
marriage had been established, in light of the one-year determination requirement and
in light of the lack of evidence on some of the elements of common law marriage.
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Given that no common law marriage existed, the award of temporary support had no
basis and should be reversed.
V,

THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
FINDINGS
OF
FACT
SUPPORTING ITS ALIMONY AWARD ARE NOT
ADEQUATE AND ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

With respect to Wayne Kelley's income, the trial court made the following
findings of fact:
34.
The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his
corporations by taking funds through loans and not as income with these
withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not a traditional method of
compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he has
seen fit.
35.
The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of
these businesses to meet his own living expenses and to purchase
property for his own interest. The Mercedes 600SL is an example.
36.
The Court finds that historically respondent has had an
income in excess of $10,000 a month with funds received from the
Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 a month from DSL Currently,
respondent receives a salary $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as
income from his various businesses.
Consistent with past
manipulations, respondent currently has manipulated his income to limit
his income presented in this proceeding.
37.
The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above
coincide with the amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet
ongoing family expenses, both prior to the entry of the decree of divorce
in July 1994, and since that time.
38.
The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to
produce income at the amount of $10,000 per month and finds that his
income is in this amount.
(R. at 1668-69.)
The evidence relating to Wayne Kelley's income was as follows:

Wayne

Kelley testified that he was currently receiving a salary of $6,000 per month from
Omega Oil. (Vol. Ill, tr. p. 155.) He testified that in the past, he had received a draw
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from DSI of $8,000 per month, and in addition, had received $10,000 per month in
income from the Kodiak property located in Alaska. (Vol. Ill, tr. pp. 154-5.) He
testified that the monthly income from the Kodiak property ended in June of 1996.
That testimony was not refuted.
Sonia Kelley testified that Wayne Kelley had provided approximately $7,000
to $7,500 per month in funds to the family from 1994 to 1996. (R. a1 50.) That
testimony was likewise not refuted.
Testimony was also received from both Wayne Kelley and Fred Frink that
Wayne Kelley had had access to an expensive Mercedes vehicle during the parties'
separation. However, despite the fact that extensive testimony was presented on this
issue, no evidence at all was presented to indicate that the Mercedes was purchased
with Wayne Kelley's personal funds.
Likewise, extensive evidence was presented that Wayne Kelley was residing in
a home located in Park City, Utah, with a value of more than 1.5 million dollars.
Again, although extensive testimony was presented on this issue, no evidence was
presented that the home was purchased with Wayne Kelley's personal funds.
There simply was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that Wayne
Kelley had the ability at the time of trial to produce income of $10,000 per month. As
the trial court correctly noted, during parts of the marriage, Wayne Kelley did well
financially; at other times, he did poorly. As the trial court correctly noted, there had
even been a bankruptcy.

There was unrefuted testimony that DSI's financial

condition was poor and that it had substantial debt.
The mere fact that Wayne Kelley had in the past had higher income than he had
at the time of trial does not support the trial court's findings.
Even if Wayne Kelley were to make $10,000 per month, he would be required
to pay income taxes on that amount. If his income taxes amounted to 30%, it is
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difficult to understand how he could pay his own expenses, debts, attorney's fees as
ordered by the court, and still pay alimony and child support of $5,000 per month.
The Utah Court of Appeals has repeatedly said that in determining whether to
award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court must consider the needs of the
recipient spouse, the earning capacity of the recipient spouse, the ability of the obligor
spouse to provide support, and the length of the marriage. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306. In this
case, the trial court found that Sonia Kelley's reasonable monthly expenses, not
including her income tax liability, were $5,000 per month. The trial court indicated
that Wayne Kelley had testified as to expenses of $10,500 per month, but did not
make a finding as to what Wayne Kelley's expenses were. The trial court did not
explain how it calculated Sonia Kelley's income tax liability, how it took into account
her income from her employment, or how Wayne Kelley would have the ability to pay
the amount of alimony, child support, debt, and attorney's fees ordered.
In Rehn, the Court said the trial court must make detailed findings on all
material issues which should "include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 974 P.2d at 310.
(Citation omitted.)
Because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact, and
because the findings of fact are inadequate, the alimony award should be reversed.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT
SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

In this case, there was extensive testimony about attorneys' fees owed by each
of the parties. In addition to ordering Wayne Kelley to pay $5,000 per month in
combined alimony and child support, and creating arrearages of approximately
$37,000 for child support and $56,000 for alimony, the trial court ordered Wayne
Kelley to pay attorneys' fees to Sonia Kelley's attorneys, Louise Knauer of $10,951,
and to B.L. Dart and Mark Larsen of $25,000.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1998) provides for awards of attorney's fees in
divorce cases.

There are three findings required to be made by a trial court in

awarding attorney's fees: (1) the receiving spouse's financial need; (2) the payor
spouse's ability to pay; and (3) the reasonableness of the requested fees. Childs v.
Child*, 967 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1998).
In this case, the trial court found that the fees requested by Louise Knauer were
reasonable, that the fees requested by B.L. Dart and Mark Larsen should be reduced
from $46,574.95 to $25,000, and that as to Louise Knauer's fees, Sonia Kelley had no
funds with which to pay them. (Finding of Fact No. 42, R. at 1669.) The trial court
also found that Wayne Kelley had "a substantial ability to earn an income." (Finding
of Fact No. 41, R. at 1669.)
As indicated previously, the trial court found that Wayne Kelley had an income
of $10,000 per month from which he should pay combined alimony and child support
of $5,000 per month, plus all the marital debts and his own expenses. The trial court
did not explain how Wayne Kelley could also obtain the funds necessary to pay the
attorney's fees awarded. Thus, the trial court's ruling with respect to attorney's fees is
not supported by sufficient factual findings and should be reversed.
VII.

THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON CONTEMPT DID NOT SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT WAYNE KELLEY
HAD THE CURRENT ABILITY TO PAY THE ORDERED
AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT, ALIMONY, AND
MARITAL DEBT.

The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on July 22, 1999. However,
before the decree was actually entered, Sonia Kelley filed a motion with the court
seeking to have Wayne Kelley held in contempt of court for failure to pay the ordered
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amounts of alimony, child support, and marital debt. The evidentiary hearing on the
contempt issue took place on June 25, 1999.
At the hearing, Wayne Kelley testified that he was employed by Omega Oil,
receiving income of $6,000 per month.

(Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing on

June 25, 1999, hereinafter referred to as "Contempt Tr.," at p. 4.) He testified that he
had no other source of income and no assets. (Contempt Tr. pp. 4-5.)
Wayne Kelley also testified that he had substantial debt. (Contempt Tr. at
pp. 5-6.) Mr. Kelley testified that the trial court's order required him to maintain life
insurance and health insurance for the benefit of his children and ex-wife, and that he
was required to pay premiums for those policies.
On cross-examination, Wayne Kelley testified that he had received $15,000 as
a personal loan, for which he had pledged his shares in DSI as collateral. (Contempt
Tr. p. 18.) Because he could not repay the loan, the shares were taken. Wayne Kelley
further indicated that he no longer had a mortgage obligation on a house in Park City,
Utah. Those payments had been made by DSI. (Contempt Tr. p. 22.) No testimony
or other evidence was presented that Wayne Kelley had any other sources of income,
or any other opportunities to produce income.
Based on that evidence, the trial court found that Wayne Kelley had the ability
to produce income of $10,000 a month at a minimum, that Wayne Kelley had
voluntarily chosen to stay with Omega Oil, and that Wayne Kelley had the ability to
generate sufficient income to meet the obligations that he was ordered to pay.
(Findings of Fact re: Contempt Nos. 4, 5, and 6, R. at 1690.) The trial court found that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Wayne Kelley was in contempt by
reason of his failure to pay the debts and obligations and failure to pay the ordered
amounts of child support and alimony.
No evidence was adduced at the hearing on contempt that Wayne Kelley had
income beyond the $6,000 a month from Omega Oil as he testified. The evidence did
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indicate that he had consistently paid $2,000 per month as child support from that
income.
In making its finding that Wayne Kelley had the ability to pay alimony, child
support, and debt, the trial court apparently relied on its previous findings in the
divorce proceedings that Wayne Kelley had the ability to produce income of $10,000
per month. However, there was no evidence that Wayne Kelley had that ability at the
time of the hearing on contempt. The only evidence presented that Wayne Kelley
might have additional resources was the fact that he invited his children to go with
him to Africa. However, the unrefuted testimony was that another person would have
paid the children's expenses on such a trip.
In Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983), the issue was whether the
defendant was in contempt for failure to pay alimony. The Court reaffirmed its prior
holdings that, in order to sustain a finding of contempt, there must be clear and
convincing proof that the defendant (1) knew what was required; (2) had the ability to
comply; and (3) willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
In this case, there was no proof of any kind that Wayne Kelley had the current
ability to make the payments the trial court had ordered. Essentially, the trial court
relied on the fact that Wayne Kelley had had higher income in the past. This does not
amount to clear and convincing evidence of a current ability to comply with the trial
court's order.
Because there was no evidence that Wayne Kelley had the current ability to
pay the amounts ordered, the trial court's findings of contempt should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should have granted Wayne Kelley's motion for summary
judgment, because Sonia Kelley did not obtain a determination of common law
marriage within the one-year time frame required by the statute. The statute does not
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violate the uniform operation clause of the Utah Constitution, because it does not
create an impermissible classification, and because it is a reasonable means to further
legislative objectives.
Moreover, the trial court failed to deal with several elements required to be
established to sustain a common law marriage determination.
Because there was no common law marriage, the trial court erred in awarding
temporary alimony and child support during the pendency of the proceedings. In
addition, the trial court's findings with respect to its alimony award are inadequate.
The trial court also failed to make sufficient findings to support its award of
attorneys' fees.
With respect to the issues consolidated with this appeal, there was no evidence
in the record from which the trial court could find by clear and convincing evidence
that Wayne Kelley had the current ability to pay the alimony and child support
awarded, and the trial court's finding of contempt was improper.
DATED this [Q

day of November, 1999.
Respectfully submitted,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUfilCIAL<.DISTFf€Tv ""
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH;- . ' ^ ; ? . ''7 ty

SONIAKELLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

RULING ON PLAINTD7FTS AND
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS

WAYNE KELLEY,
Defendant.
Case No. 944700827 DA
This matter came before the Court for oral arguments on both parties1 objections to the
recommendations made October 10, 1997 by Commissioner David S. Dillon of this Court.
Plaintiff was present and represented by Mark A. Larsen. Defendant was also present,
represented by Clifford C. Ross.
After the presentation by both sides of oral argument, the Court ruled that it would not
follow Commissioner Dillon's September 25, 1997 recommendation that there had been a
determination of common-law marriage between the parties within the required one year time
limit. The Court specifically found that Judge Michael G. Allphin's brief statements at a
temporary support hearing held October 11, 1996 did not amount to the "determination" or
"establishment" required by U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5. The Court took the matter under advisement on
the constitutional and estoppel issues to prepare a written opinion. The Court has reviewed the
applicable law, as well as all pleadings submitted by the parties, and herebyfindsand rules as
follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds the following relevant facts in this case:
1.

That the parties were legally married May 24, 1980, at Forth Worth, Texas;

2.

That plaintiff, citing irreconcilable differences, filed a verified complaint for divorce

in this Court June 7, 1994, case no. 944700827;
3.

That pursuant to defendant's default, this Court entered a decree of divorce July

18, 1994;
4.

That plaintiff moved this Court, on June 14, 1996, to set aside the Decree of

Divorce, alleging that defendant hadfraudulentlyinduced her into seeking such divorce for
reasons relating to defendant's business liabilities, that the parties had thereafter continued to live
as man and wife until April of 1996 when they separated in fact, and that the support amounts
(child and alimony) reached in that divorce were less than she would have received in a fair
divorce;
5.

That plaintiff thereafter filed a separate common-law divorce action in this Court

(case no. 964701047), alleging the existence of a common-law marriage under U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5
since the time of the parties1 divorce in case no. 944700827; and seeking support and alimony in
an amount substantially increased over the amount awarded in the parties1 prior divorce decree;
6.

That plaintiff also moved this Courtvin case no. 944700827, to modify the Decree

of Divorce, as an alternative method of relief if her motion to set aside the divorce should fail;
7.

That plaintiff attempted to conduct discovery on issues involving defendant's

financial status, which were resisted by defendant, ultimately resulting in motions to compel and
for a bench warrant and sanctions by plaintiff, which were heard at a hearing in front of Judge
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Michael G. Allphin of this Court on October 11, 1996, along with other issues relating to support
and visitation. Plaintiff alleges that she was prepared, at that hearing, to discuss issues relating to
the existence of a common-law marriage, but did not fiilly go forward on those issues because she
received the support she was requesting. At the close of oral arguments, Judge Allphin took the
matter under advisement to prepare a written ruling;
8.

That in his written ruling, Judge Allphin awarded plaintiff $6,000 per month in

support afterfindingappropriate income and factors to support such an award, but made no
writtenfindingsconcerning the existence of a common-law marriage. An order on the ruling was
signed January 2, 1997;
9.

That defendant continued to resist discovery of his and his corporation's (DSI)

financial status, filing various motions to quash and protective orders, while plaintiff moved the
Court for a judgment on back support owing. The Court heard oral argument January 22, 1997,
and made oralfindings,upon which the Court signed an order dated March 31, 1997. The order
awarded plaintiff judgment on her claim, but stayed execution, and ordered: the parties to sell
several of their assets; defendant to comply with discovery on all documents except that relating
to confidential documents concerning a lawsuit settlement DSI had received; and a special master
appointed. The order also denied defendant's motion to reduce support, and also disposed of
several other minor matters;
10.

That Plaintiff moved the Court April 4, 1997 to withdraw her motion to set aside

the Decree of Divorce;
11.

That plaintiff thereafter, on April 25, 1997, filed a verified motion for an order to

show cause, on the issues of contempt for allegedly continuing to fail to pay the support ordered,
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and asking for various other forms of relief, including defendant's executing a deed to the parties'
home so that it might be sold before being foreclosed upon, which execution of deed was set forth
in the parties' 1994 divorce decree, and which defendant had not yet complied with;
12.

That at the order to show cause hearing, held May 6, 1997 in this Court, defendant

executed the deed to the parties' home. The Court also awarded judgment against defendant for
back support, ordered his Park City home to be sold, and ordered sanctions of $100.00 per day
for every day after May 16, 1997 for which there is non-compliance with discovery orders;
13.

That defendant thereafter objected to plaintiffs proposed order on the Court's

findings at the May 6, 1997 hearing and moved to consolidate cases nos. 944700872 and
964701047;
14.

That June 12, 1997 the Court entered an order on its May 6, 1997 ruling ;

15.

That the two cases were consolidated June 12, 1997;

16.

That a hearing on defendant's motion for a protective order regarding discovery

was heard in front of Commissioner Dillon August 1, 1997, in which Commissioner Dillon
partially granted defendant's motion;
17.

That defendant thereafter moved the Court for dismissal or partial summary

judgment, alleging in essence no determination of the existence of a common-law marriage within
the one-year period specified by U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, and therefore no cause of action;
18.

That plaintiff moved the Court for a further judgment on the defendant's contempt

for failure to pay support, alleging an amount owing of $52,409 25,
19.

That Judge Alfred Van Wagenen of this Court entered a protective order August

22, 1997 allowing defendant to disclose (to plaintiff and counsel only) the amount of the DSI
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lawsuit settlement, but not requiring any disclosure as to any other fact or term of such
settlement;
20.

That at a hearing infrontof Commissioner Dillon held September 25, 1997 the

parties argued issues relating to defendant's motion to dismiss or for partial summary judgment.
Commissioner Dillon ruled that Judge Allphin's statements at the October 11, 1996 hearing
constituted an adjudication that there had been a common-law marriage, and that defendant's
failure to comply with discovery estopped himfromraising the defense of the time bar, but did
not rule on issues raised by plaintiff concerning the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5;
21.

That both plaintiff and defendant filed objections to Commissioner Dillon's

recommendations, plaintiff objecting to Commissioner Dillon's failure to rule on the
constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, and defendant on thefindingsof estoppel and of a prior
adjudication as to a common-law marriage;
22.

That the matter came before this Court November 18, 1997 for a hearing on

defendant's objections. The Court, as stated supra, set aside Commissioner Dillon's
recommendations that there had been a prior adjudication as to a common-law marriage and took
under advisement the estoppel and constitutional issues. The Court left support and alimony as
previously ordered;
23.

That none of plaintiffs written discovery requests to defendant dealt with issues

directly relating to the existence of a common-law marriage. The discovery requests in the case
file generally relate to defendant'sfinancialstatus, DSI'sfinancialstatus, the lawsuit settlement
DSI received, and the corporate relationship between DSI and defendant. While defendant surely
failed to comply with both the rules and the Court's orders relating to written discovery on these
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issues, his compliance or non-compliance with such discovery can not be said to have prejudiced
plaintiffs attempts to obtain a determination on the common-law marriage issue. Plaintiff alleges
that had defendant made himself available for deposition, notices of which were set repeatedly,
and thereafter repeatedly ignored by defendant, plaintiff would have deposed him on the commonlaw marriage issues, rather than solely on thefinancialissues. The Court has no evidence of this
intention before it - significantly, the only sworn affidavits concerning defendant's refusal to be
deposed arefromLouise T. Knauer, plaintiffs former counsel, (at Exhibits "D" and "F" to
plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and For Partial Summary
Judgment) which make no mention of issues relating to common-law marriage, but speak only to
financial disclosure matters;
24.

That plaintiff never, within the one year period after April of 1996, the last date

she alleges the parties were living together as man and wife, formally moved the Court for an
adjudication as to the parties' common-law marriage status. The common-law marriage issue is
central to plaintiffs complaint filed in case no. 964701047, but the issue has never been directly
addressed in any proceeding, including that presently before the Court. Specifically, as pointed
out by defendant, she has never moved the Court for summary judgment on the issue.
From the above-stated facts the Court rules as follows:
ESTOPPEL
Defendant moves the Court for summary judgment and sets forth facts which he asserts
would entitle him to such. Plaintiff has not directly disputed such facts, but alleges that her failure
to comply with the one-year time limit imposed by U.C. A. § 30-1-4.5 is due solely to defendant's
refusal to comply with discovery, and that he should thus be estopped from asserting such as a bar
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to plaintiffs action. She alleges that she has repeatedly attempted to conduct discovery of
defendant which would have allowed her to prove the common-law marriage issue. Plaintiff fails
to present evidence that would allow the Court to refute that which is before the Court, in the
form of the pleadings of the case file.
In the matter before the Court there appear to be few material factual disputes - perhaps
the facts relating to defendant's conduct with respect to conducting discovery are in dispute,
although such have not been specifically plead. The parties do seem to be in opposition on the
question of what issues defendant was to be deposed, with plaintiff alleging, in her statement of
supplemental facts, that deposition was to be conducted on common-law marriage issues, as well
as others. Plaintiff cites no record reference as required by Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., and there is no
evidence whatsoever in the case record to support such an assertion. Rather, as set forth above,
all pleadings related to that issue speak only to the disclosure offinancialinformation.
Defendant also sets forth that plaintiff never moved the Court for summary judgment on
the common-law marriage issue, which would have allowed her to put her own facts before the
Court and required defendant to refute those facts with his own. Plaintiff argues that she was
prepared to address the issue at the October 11, 1996 hearing infrontof Judge Allphin, but never
did so because of Judge Allphin's determination that support should be awarded. Both parties
have submitted transcripts, not certified, of the Court's discussion relating to that issue - they are
the same, and not objected to by either party, thus the Court would adopt such as a correct
transcript of the actual discussion for the purpose of this ruling. Ms. Knauer, plaintiffs former
counsel, asked the Court:
Is the Court inclined to want to hear about whether there's a common-law marriage?
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The Court replied:
Given the facts in this case, Mr. Crist, I'm inclined to treat this as, at least on a
temporary basis, as if he has an obligation of support and then just determine how
much that obligation is as opposed to hearing a lot on the common law marriage. . .
this is a case where they lived together for a substantial period of time after the 1994
divorce, held themselves out as husband and wife, and I realize he may want to
contest the fact that it's common-law divorce, but at least on a temporary basis. . . I'm
going to treat it as if he had an obligation to support.
Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was prejudiced as to a resolution of the common-law
marriage issue solely through defendant's resistance to discovery. That is not to say that
defendant's actions did not significantly delay the matter going to trial, as it likely has done just
that, the effect of which the Court addresses in the next section, infra. Nevertheless, she has
never, to this point, formally moved the Court for an adjudication of the common-law marriage
issue, thus it was never properly before the Court for a "determination" before the one-year time
limit expired. Plaintiffs assertions that she wanted to raise the issue at the October 11, 1996
hearing do not explain why it was not raised otherwise, after it was not fully addressed at that
hearing. As such, the defense of estoppel is unavailable to her to defeat defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UCA § 30-1-4.5
As an alternative defense to defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment,
plaintiff argues that the statute in question, U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, in unconstitutional, both on its
face, and as applied. Specifically, plaintiff claims that it violates the "Open Courts" provision of
the Utah Constitution (Article I, section 11) because, on its face, "it constitutes an arbitrary,
unjustified deprivation of the right to adjudication." (Plaintiffs memo in opposition.) Plaintiff also
claims that, as applied in this case, the statute is unconstitutional in that it forecloses her rights
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when the failure to receive the required adjudication is the fault of the defendant. In defense of
his position, defendant cites Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App 1995), where that
Court held that the language requiring a "determination" within one year meant just that, rather
than meaning "filing" the action; and also argued that plaintiff had failed to notify the Utah
Attorney General of her intention to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, as he alleges is
required by U.C.A. §78-33-11.
Initially, the Court disposes of defendant's contention that plaintiffs unconstitutionality
defense must fail because the attorney general had not been notified. The text of U.C.A. § 78-3311, "Parties," is:
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which
involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance or franchise such municipality
or county shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or
statefranchiseor permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be served
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard
(emphasis added) The Court finds the above statute to have no effect on this proceeding. The
chapter this section is under is entitled "Declaratory Judgments," and it is clear from its context
that the section applies to those cases where a declaratory judgment on the validity of a law is
sought as a cause of action. Here, plaintiff is asserting the invalidity of the statute as a defense to
summary judgment in a domestic matter, and for no other purpose, thus the Court sees no reason
to implicate the notice statute as relevant to the matter. If the basis of her common-law divorce
complaint was substantially premised on the invalidity of the statute, however, the Court might
have found differently. Nevertheless, even if the statute could be construed to require plaintiff to
notify the attorney general, such was accomplished. The attorney general has intervened in this
9

case as of June 6, 1997, and has received copies of all pleadings since that time, including those
referencing this issue. Mr. Richard Hummel, the assistant attorney general assigned to this case,
could have requested to address this issue at oral argument, had he so desired. There is,
therefore, no violation of U.C.A. § 78-33-11, and this argument is rejected.
U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5, "Validity of marriage not solemnized," reads as follows:
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and
valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract
between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions
of this chapter;
© have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume maritalrights,duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation
as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur
during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one year following the
termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general
rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
(emphasis added) As set forth above, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Bunch, held that the statute's
plain meaning literally required a "determination" or "adjudication" within one year of the
termination of the alleged common-law relationship, rather than the simple filing of an action for
such a determination within one year. That Court, affirming the trial court's decision, held there
to be no ambiguity within the time limit provision, and thus no allowance for any interpretation
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contrary to the plain terms. Plaintiff has not argued the meaning of the statute to be other than
such plain meaning, but the Court sets forth this standard toframethe constitutional question.
In Bunch, at appeal, the appellant also attempted to raise constitutional challenges to the
statute, which the Court dismissed because they had not been properly raised at the trial level.
Citing State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court held that "the proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation
is before the trial court, not, as typically happens . . . for the first time on appeal." Bunch, 906
P.2d at 921. Appellant had attempted to argue at appeal that the statute violated both sections 7
and 11 of Article I of the Utah Constitution (the sections entitled "Due Process of Law," and
"Courts Open - Redress of Injuries," respectively). The Court of Appeals held that appellant's
trial court mention of "concerns" about the statute's constitutionality amounted to "nominally
alluding" to the issue, a level of discussion held to be insufficient to allow review on appeal by
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),1 and thus rejected the argument.
This Court concludes that the question of the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 is
properly before it and proceeds to rule on that issue:
Plaintiffs, although generally alleging U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 to be violative of the Utah
Constitution, do not reference any particular constitutional provision other than the "Open
Courts" provision, Article I, section 11. That section reads:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party.

1

Reversed on other grounds, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991).
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Before proceeding to analyze whether the statute violates the open courts provision, a
preliminary question must be answered by the Court: Is the nature of the right eliminated of a
type that its destruction may be addressed with reference to the open courts provision? The Utah
Supreme Court, in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.T 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), referencing a prior
decision, Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612
(1948), stated, with respect to Article I, section 11 rights:
In a sense, therefore, the common law at the time of statehood provides a measure of
the kinds of legal remedies that theframersmust have had in mind (at least in scope
if not in form) for the protection of life, property, and reputation.
BerryT 717 P.2d at 676 n.3. In Ross v. SchackeL 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act under the
open courts clause. (Open courts analysis of immunity is closely akin to that relating to statutes of
repose, like that performed in Berry, in that a remedy is foreclosed through the operation of a
statute.) After citing Berry, the Court stated: "In deciding whether this subsection abrogated such
a remedy, we must examine the common law at the time of statehood to determine whether a
prisoner could recover damages from a prison physician for negligent medical care." Ross. 920
P.2d at 1162. In Debry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), another immunity case, the Court
stated: "We have previously indicated that the scope of the protections afforded by article I,
section 11 had to be viewed in light of the immunities that were recognized when the Utah
Constitution was adopted. See Madsen IT 658 P.2d at 629." Debry. 889 P.2d at 435. In Cruz v.
Wright. 765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988) the Court looked at the dismissal of a loss of consortium claim
under the open courts clause. The Court, in affirming the trial court's dismissal, disagreed with
the appellant on both her argument that such a cause of action existed at the time the Utah
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Constitution was adopted and on her argument that the passage of the 1898 Married Women's
Act unconstitutionally abolished any possibility of the cause of action. This Court must therefore
determine if a cause of action such as that now existing under U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 existed at the
time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Courtfindsthat it did not.
The Utah Supreme Court in Whyte v. Blair. 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994) stated:
Prior to 1987, Utah never recognized common law marriages; indeed, such marriages
were expressly prohibited. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(3) (1984) (repealed by §
30-1-4.5 (1987)): In re Vetas' Estate. 110 Utah 187, 190, 170P.2d 183, 184(1946);
see also Layton v. Layton. 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Whyte. 885 P.2d at 793. As all open court analysis must be premised on the basis that such a
right existed at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, and since no such right existed
at that time, the Court must find that there can be no open courts violation by its restriction.
Uniform Operation of Laws / Equal Protection Analysis
The parties did not raise the issue of a possible equal protection violation at oral argument
or in their briefs. Nevertheless, the Courtfindsthe matter to be of sufficient import to raise and
address it sua sponte. While review of the one-year time limit is foreclosed under the open courts
clause, because of the "unavailability of the remedy at the time of adoption of the constitution"
reason stated above, no such prohibition exists as to review under Article I, § 24. That section
succinctly states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The clause is
analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Although their language is dissimilar, these provisions embody the same general
principle: persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in
different circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). The history and operation of the two clauses are not
necessarily parallel, however. The Malan Court went on to say:
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Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution incorporates the same
general fundamental principles as are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause,
our construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal
courts' construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive in applying Article
I, § 24, e.g., Baker v. Matheson. Utah, 607 P.2d 233, 243 n.4 (1979), but that law is
not binding so long as we do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Bierkamp v. Rogers. Iowa, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (1980); Carson v. Maurer.
120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980); Nehring v. Russell. Wyo., 582 P.2d 67, 76
(1978). The different language of Article I, § 24, the different constitutional contexts
of the two provisions, and different jurisprudential considerations may lead to a
different result in applying equal protection principles under Article I, § 24 than might
be reached under federal law.
IJL, at 670. See also, Lee v. Gaufin. 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993). The Lee Court explained
the analysis to be used in reviewing the constitutionality of a statute under Article I, section 24.
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not enough that
it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform.
A law does not operate uniformly if "persons similarly situated" are not "treated
similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" are "treated as if their
circumstances were the same." Malan v Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). In
State Tax Commission v Department of Finance. 576 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Utah 1978),
the Court stated:
Equal protection protects against discrimination within a class. The
legislature has considerable discretion in the designation of classifications but
the court must determine whether such classifications operate equally on all
persons similarly situated.
Thus, whether a classification operates uniformly on all persons similarly situated
within constitutional parameters is an issue that must ultimately be decided by the
judiciary.
Lee, 867 P.2d at 577. (emphasis supplied)

On the same subject the Malan Court stated:

Article I, § 24 protects against two types of discrimination. First, a law must
apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and
the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. If the relationship of the
classification to the statutory objectives is unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination
is unreasonable.
14

When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one
person or group of persons from among a larger class on the basis of a tenuous
justification that has little or no merit.
Equal protection of the law, both state and federal, requires more of a state
law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes. The
classification must rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just
relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be
made arbitrarily and without any such basis . . . Arbitrary selection can never be
justified by calling it classification. The Courts must reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.
Malan, at 670-672. (citations omitted) The Malan Court implied the level of review that is
applicable to specific varieties of rights under Article I, section 24 analysis, and the Lgg Court
adopted and illuminated that standard. There, the Court said:
After Allen was decided, Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), held that
a standard of scrutiny stricter than the rational-basis standard governed when a
discrimination implicated a right protected by the open courts provision of Article I,
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. In Malan, the Court stated that in applying
Article I, section 24, it was necessary to distinguish between discriminations against
economic or social interests and discriminations that implicated rights protected by
Article I, section 11. In the latter instance, a higher standard ofjudicial scrutiny was
required because two constitutional values must be given due recognition: (1) the
policy underlying the uniform operation of the laws provision, which militates against
arbitrary laws that favor the interests of the politically powerful over the interests of
the politically vulnerable; and (2) the policy that a person has a constitutional right to
a remedy for an injury to one's person.
Lss, 867 P.2d at 58 L2 Therefore, before proceeding to analyze the operation of Article I, section
24 with respect to the common-law marriage time bar, the Court mustfirstdetermine the level of
review applicable. As set forth above, the Court does notfindtherightcreated by U.C.A. § 30-14.5 of the type included as one of those protected by Article I, section 11. While some courts

2

Footnote 14 to Lee (p.581) states: "Malan did not adopt the federal equal protection analytical framework
that applies one of three levels of scrutiny, depending on the nature of the interest discriminated against. See Malan. 693
P.2d at 674 n. 17; accord Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 888-90 (Utah 1988)."
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have indeed held the right to a judicial determination of relationships between married people
analogous to a "fundamentalright,"3it is hard to see, given the history, that Utah courts would
adopt this view with respect to therightto a common-law marriage determination. It is this
Court's opinion that such arightis more in the nature of an "economic or social interest" that
merits "rational-basis" analysis.4 Other courts have so held - " . . . the Court is unable to find the
protection of a marital estate or community propertyrightsimpinges upon a "fundamental right."
White v. State Farm. 907 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 199S)(see9 infra, n.14, for a further discussion
of this case); "actually, even now the existence of a constitutional right to commit adultery is
somewhat problematical and has not been recognized in any decisions to which our attention has
been drawn." Chlystekv Kane. 412 F.Supp. 20 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
With the above points of reference in mind, the Court must determine, under a rationalbasis review, if the one-year time limitation of U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 is constitutional under Article I,
section 24. The Lee Court set forth the actual review process to be used under this standard:
Under the rational-basis, or least restrictive standard, a statutory classification
is constitutional unless it has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose
or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose. A presumption of
constitutionality is extended to statutes . . . and that presumption is sufficient to
sustain the constitutionality of a classification created by the statute unless the
classification creates an invidious discrimination, or bears no rational relationship to
a legitimate state purpose. Moreover, the presumption requires a court to presume
that the classification was intended to further the legislative purpose.
IsL, at 580. (citations omitted)

3

See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371; 91 S. Ct. 780; 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971).

4

Such "rational-basis" analysis under Article I, section 24 is not necessarily as liberally in favor of the
legislature's discretion as that applied by Federal Courts under the fourteenth amendment, however. See, e.g., Mountain
Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884, 889-890 (Utah 1988) (citing cases where statutes impinging on non"fundamentaT interests were struck down).
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While the above-quoted language appears to create two avenues of review, one under
"invidious discrimination," and one under "legitimate state purpose," the two are actually one, as
"invidious discrimination" means that discrimination which is arbitrary, irrational and not
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U S 184, 191,
85 S Ct. 283, 13 L Ed 2d 222 (1964) 5 All laws create classifications - and by classification,
some may feel that there is discrimination6 However, only that discrimination found to be
"invidious" is subject to judicial review with respect to "non-fiindamental" rights

To begin the

process of analysis, the Court must determine the classifications resulting from the operation of
the one-year time bar The Court finds the operation of the law to create two disparately-treated
opposing sub-classes from a larger class that was originally similarly-situated When a party is
unable to obtain a judicial determination of common-law marriage within one year, for one or
more of many reasons, that party, and others so affected, become a class Those that are able to
have such a determination within the year constitute another class Below, the Court reviews the
reasonableness of the discriminatory treatment accorded the classes
5

U S v Comm'r of Correction. 316 F Supp 556,564 (S D N Y 1970), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 826
(6th ed 1990) states "Term 'invidious' in context of claim that difference in treatment amounts to 'invidious
discrimination' in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, means arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a
state purpose " (citing Eaton v State. 363 A 2d 440,441 (Del 1976))
6

M

A11 laws, either explicitly by their terms or implicitly by exclusionfromthe scope of the law, create legal
classifications Justice Wolfe stated m State v Mason. 94 Utah 501,507,78 P 2d 920,923 (1938)
Of course, every legislative act is in one sense discriminatory The Legislature cannot in one
act legislate as to all persons or all subject matters It is inclusive as to some class or group
and as to some human relationships, transactions, or functions and exclusive as to the See
also, remainder For that reason, to be unconstitutional the discrimination must be
unreasonable or arbitrary A classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary m its inclusion
or exclusion features so long as there is some basis for the differentiation between classes or
subject matters included as compared to those excludedfromits operation, provided the
differentiation bears a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act"
Lee, 867 P 2d at 577, n 6
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The statute, as set forth, requires that the necessary determination be obtained within one
year of the termination of the relationship. There are numerous reasons, some the fault of the
party seeking the determination, many not, that such a determination might not be able to be
obtained within that one year. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Bunch, if an appellate court
were to overturn a trial court determination of common-law marriage and remand the matter, the
issue "might" not be decided within the required period.7 Given the time it takes in our system for
a matter to be resolved, and then to go through the appellate process and back to the trial court, it
is this Court's opinion that a final decision within the one-year period would actually be highly
unlikely. If the facts were reversed, and an appellate court reversed and remanded a trial decision
of no common law marriage, the same result would likely also occur, and there would again be no
determination within the required time.
Other possible scenarios precluding a determination within one year are:
1.

The party opposing the determination vigorously resists any determination before

the year passes. Any reasonably competent attorney can use various tactics to successfully delay
the forward process of a proceeding. Discovery can be held up, the parties can be intentionally or
unintentionally unavailable, spurious objections and motions can be made, as well as numerous
other tactics used by which the matter can be delayed until the one-year period passes. Defendant
argues that plaintiff could have moved the Court for summary judgment on the issue despite his
actions, yet a motion for summary judgment can also be relatively easily delayed - Rule 56(f)
continuances are routinely granted as a matter of course. If the action is commenced close to the
one year mark, statutory periods governing the time opposing parties are given to respond, and

7

ElfflclL906P.2dat921,n.3.
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the time for submitting and deciding the matter after pleadings have been completed might easily
foreclose a timely determination. In the Court's opinion, furthermore, motions for summary
judgment are particularly ill-suited to domestic matters, especially one such as this. This Court
cannot recall such a motion, before the present, having ever been filed in a domestic matter. Even
if such a motion were used, the factual disputes particularly inherent to domestic matters would
likely preclude a summary determination that there was a common-law marriage, and there is no
right to an evidentiary hearing at summary judgment. If no such determination were therein
obtained, the matter could not proceed until it was heard for trial. Furthermore, the Court is
unaware of any other type of legal question that must be submitted, once filed, to a determination
within a certain time, even if the matter is not yet ready for an actual trial.
2.

The caseload and procedures of the Court reviewing the matter might not allow

for determination within a year, especially if the matter were commenced later in the one-year
period. Cases, especially in this regard, complicated divorce cases, can often take longer than a
year to get to trial. Even with the most agreeable counsel, such cases are often the subject of
several preliminary matters that must be set for hearing and heard before other related issues can
go forward. Contentious counsel can extend such periods much longer.
In this district, as in several others within the state, a domestic relations commissioner
hears all preliminary matters prior to the actual trial. The commissioner may only make
"recommendations" to the trial court - their decisions are not final.8. It is doubtful that such a
"recommendation" would meet the "determination or establishment" standard required by U.C.A.
§ 30-1-4.5, and would therefore require ratification by the trial court before reaching such a level.
8

U.C. J. A., Rule 6-401 (6)(A).
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U.C.J.A., Rule 6-401(4), states: "the commissioner's recommendation is the order of the court
until modified by the court." The modification procedure involves objecting to the
recommendation within ten days of the decision, after which a hearing may be set by the district
court on the issue. In actual practice, however, objections are often left unresolved until the time
of trial, which may occur long after the year period has passed. Even more insidious would be a
situation where the commissioner's recommendation is that there was a common-law marriage,
the opposing party objects, and the matter is not heard until trial, at which point the trial court,
after the year is over, reverses the recommendation. Any possibility of appellate review, reversal
and remand would be foreclosed. Such scenarios do not even address the situations where courts,
through their own negligence or bureaucratic inefficiency, are unable to resolve the matter in the
required time. Files are lost, hearing schedules are miscommunicated, more pressing matters
require priority attention, etc. . .9
It appears the type of time limit within U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 represents an aberration on the
entire body of U.S. law. The Court has been unable, after substantial research, to find even a
single comparable statute in operation in the entire country, under any area of law that
significantly affects therightsof individuals. Furthermore, the Court has not found a single
appellate decision reviewing such a time statute, attesting to their rarity, if not absolute non-

9

The above list is, of course, not all-inclusive. Many other factors could influence whether a determination
within the statutory period might be available. The time limitation in U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5 could conceivably be termed a
statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations. In that estoppel and other forms of tolling of the statutory time may
not be available under statutes of repose, any number of personal and institutional crises, emergencies, etc, that would
generally be (fairly) allowed to continue a matter would be useless. See, e.g., Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc's. 910
P.2d 1252,1258 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co. 939 P.2d 1420,1436 (10th Cir. 1991).
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existence.10 Nevertheless, simply being first to do something does not make one incorrect - the
initial problems and later great successes of the drafters of the Magna Carta, and even our own
Federal Constitution attest to that fact. Above, the Court has addressed the problems with the
operation of the statute, now it must determine if such operational problems are reasonable, nonarbitrary, and rationally related to any reasonably conceivable state purpose.
As with most Utah statutes not enacted within the very last few years, there is little
legislative history available to guide the Court as to the purposes for which the statute was
proposed. The Utah Supreme Court, in WhyteT 885 P.2d 791, stated:
The legislative history of section 30-1-4.5 clearly indicates that it is a
codification of common law marriage principles. Office of Legislative Research &
General Counsel, Summary S.B. 156 Recognition of Common Law Marriages (1987).
The summary of Senate Bill 156 expressly refers to the bill as a common law marriage
provision. It states, "Once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a court
or administrative order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes."
Although the legislative summary does not expressly declare the reasons the
Legislature adopted Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 and changed what had been basic
Utah marriage law, the Legislature's purpose is clear: A marriage under the statute is
valid from the time it is entered. If such a marriage were valid only from the time of
the entry of a formal order, then that marriage would not differ from traditional
marriages and the adoption of a common law form of marriage would serve no
purpose. The only advantage of a common law marriage is to give formal recognition
to marriages informally entered into in the past.

10

As an example of the breadth of research attempted on the issue, the Court used the search terms:
(detennin! or adjudicat! or establish! or decide! or decision!) /10 (must or shall or require!) 12 (occur or happen or "take
place") /10 (within or "no more") /3 year!, in LEXIS. In the codes/allcodes database, which contains all federal and state
statutes and regulations, 6 possible results were obtained, one of which was U.C.A. § 30-1-4.5. No other result was
even remotely applicable to the discussion. In the mega/mega database, which contains most federal and state case law
for the last 100 or so years, 26 results were seen. Four of the cases cited U.C.A § 30-1-4.5. All of the other cases
related to regulatory matters, taxation, and directives for government entities. None of the cases cited statutes having set
times for determinations affecting individual rights.
In its research the Court was able tofindone case citing a somewhat similar statute, albeit with a traditional
"commencing" deadline. White v State Farm. 907 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D. Tex. 1995) struck down under equal protection
analysis a statute reading: "A proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under this section must be commenced not
later than one year after the date on which the relationship ended or not later than one year after September 1,1989,
whichever is later." The plaintiff had argued the statute was unconstitutional under the open courts and due process
clauses, as well, but the court did not reach a decision on those issues.
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Mu, at 793-794 While somewhat helpful, such a statement gives no insight into the reasoning
behind the one year period that creates the classifications and problems discussed above The
Court would venture a guess that the legislature may have been attempting to limit the time for
action for the same reason as with other "statutes of limitations," for want of a better word
Generally, the purpose of any statute limiting a time for remedy is to compel the exercise of a
right within a reasonable time, to avoid stale claims, loss of evidence, and faded memories See,
e.g., Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter 785 P 2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) Berrv held that the
purpose of a statute of repose (which this may be) must be to eliminate a clear social or economic
evil and it must not be an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective Berry. 717
P 2d at 680 In the area of domestic law, such a statute would probably also serve the additional
purpose of allowing people to have closure in an important area of their personal lives
Against these reasonably conceivable purposes the Court must gauge the disparate
treatment afforded the different classifications under the operation of the statute u If the two are
rationally, not arbitrarily, related, then under the deference accorded such legislation, the Court
must hold the statute constitutional
It is the Courtfs opinion that no rational basis can be found for such discrimination, in that
the statute's operation is, as set forth in the scenarios above, practically de facto arbitrary The

11

Because of the statement of the legislation's effect, "Once a common law marriage has been found to exist
by a court or administrative order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes," it is the Court's opinion that a
class closely related to those able to obtain a determination within one year is comprised of those already in a solemnized
marriage Once a party is able to obtain the necessary judicial determination within one year, the party is placed m
exactly the same class as those in a solemnized marriage, with all of the same rights and benefits The most relevant of
those rights perhaps, in this instance, bemg no time limitation whatsoever for the resolution of any and all domestic
matters (This lack of tune limitation for those in the "solemnized marriage" class tends to raise a question why the
legislature might feel those m the (somewhat similarly situated) "common-law mamage" class have some
correspondingly greater need to have "closure in an important area of their personal lives ")
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only be described as invidious. The Court therefore finds the one-year provision of LI C A fc JO
1-4.5(2) unconstitutional.
The severability clause note to the section reads:
Laws 1987, ch. 246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chapter 246, oi the
application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect without the invalid provision or
application.
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CONCH JSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment is HEREBY DENIED.
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Dated January 2 ^ . 1998
BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S^AGE
DISTRICT JUDGE
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties were married to each other on the 24th day

of May 1980, in Ft. Worth, Texas.
2.

During this marriage the parties had two children born as issue of this

marriage, to wit: Christopher W. Kelley, currently 14 years of age, born February 5, 1985
and Erin Renee Kelley, currently eight years of age, born September 9, 1990.
3.

Over the course of the marriage respondent worked primarily in construction.

He founded and was the owner of Altex Construction in Alaska involved in work on the
DEW line and other government contracts.
4.

In 1990 DSI was created. Respondent owns 55% of DSI's stock. DSI was

involved in the construction of government facilities and modification of government
facilities to insulate those facilities from terrorism. This work was worldwide.
5.

During the marriage between the parties respondent's work was such that it

required him to be away from home for extended periods which included on occasion
renting apartments in which to stay. This occurred on one occasion in Colorado and on
one occasion in Texas. Because of the nature of his work, he was home intermittently,
was gone for long periods of time on a regular basis and was very seldom at home on a
long-term, continuous basis.
6.

In 1993 and 1994 DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies,

corporations which were in difficulty at that time. DSI sought to take over Mathews to
shore it up so that Mathews would be able to perform under various contracts on which DSI
2
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which created a legal fiction only, designed to protect the residence of the parties from the
threat of creditors.
11.

In connection with the divorce action petitioner contacted an attorney.

Respondent waived his rights. Both of the parties attended a parenting class and the Court
accepts the testimony of Dr. Marty Hood and finds it is credible that during the intermission
halfway through the parenting class, respondent approached her and told her that the
divorce the parties were going through was only a business thing and that the children
would never know there was even going to be a divorce and that there was no real need
for them to continue to attend the class on how to deal with the children in a divorce
situation. He further told her that there was not going to be a separation. The result of
respondent's statements was that Ms. Hood signed a Certificate of Completion allowing
the parties to leave before the class was completed.
12.

Under the Decree of Divorce petitioner was awarded the custody of the minor

children of the parties subject to respondent's rights of visitation. The petitioner was
awarded the house and furnishings. Respondent was awarded his stock in DSI and the
parties' investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. It was further provided that respondent
would be responsible for the payment of all debts up to June 1994.
13.

Respondent was to pay child support of $1,000 a month for the two minor

children of the parties and alimony of $1,000 a month to the petitioner. He was further
ordered to maintain health insurance for the children and life insurance on himself for the
benefit of the children. The divorce was granted to the petitioner on her Complaint.
4
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17.

Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, there was no

change in the relationship of the parties and in their living arrangements. The parties
continued to live the same as they had prior to the divorce. Titles to marital residence was
not transferred until after this action was filed. The title to the Kodiak property was never
transferred. The parties continued to maintain a joint checking account. The parties filed
a joint 1994 income tax return, reflecting that they were husband and wife as of the end of
1994. The parties continued to cohabit with sexual relations. The children, who at that
time were nine and three and one-half years of age, were never told about any changes
in their parents' relationship.
18.

In July, 1994, the parties appeared at a counseling class and told the

counselor that this divorce was only for business purposes and that the children would
never know that the parties were divorced. The parties continued to socialize together;
they attended a Christmas party together in December 1994, each held the other out as
a married couple. No one in the community was told of the divorce at that time. During
this time, respondent maintained an apartment in Texas.
19.

Respondent represented that he was concerned about his business dealings

and the possibility of telephone surveillance, telling the petitioner that he could not talk with
her on the phone.
20.

In May 1995, respondent sent petitioner an anniversary card in which he

indicated he loved her and a wish for another 15 years. See Exhibit No. 6.
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In the summer (
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as part of a family vacation, the parties ti aveled to

Mexico, , si lared a i oon. a,.^ ,»ad sexual relations,
22.

In October 19PC respondent faxed a letter to petitioner expressing his love
petitioner at Christmas so that things could again be the

way they had been. See Exhibit No. 8.
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The Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in connection

with the divorce in 1994

I Petitioner was college educated, and the Court: finds that her
7

claimed reliance on the representations of respondent was not justifiable. Given the
circumstances at that time, however, neither party expected the property aspects of the
divorce to be valid nor implemented.
27.

The Court finds that as of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 18,

1994, petitioner knew that they would have to remarry. As of that day, the parties were
unmarried. They continued their marital relationship, they continued to cohabit, they
continued to treat each other as married, they had joint checking accounts, and respondent
maintained all of his personal property at the marital residence. The parties filed joint
income tax returns for the 1994 year. Respondent sent petitioner money from which she
serviced joint debts.

The parties maintained joint credit cards.

The parties held

themselves out as married in the area of their domicile in Davis County, and in that area
of the domicile had the reputation of being married. They held themselves out to their
children as married. The parties continued to cohabit and hold each other out as spouse
through April of 1996. The parties had a reputation in the community for being married and
all of these actions arise out of a contract between two consenting parties.
28.

The Court has heard much testimony regarding DSI's value. It is difficult to

set the value of DSI. The Court finds that the critical day of valuation is the day of the
Court's ruling. As of this time DSI is bereft of value except for receivables and a lien on
the Bear Hollow house, which are of questionable value. In 1997 DSI did receive a
substantial settlement in litigation in which it was involved in the amount of $1,900,000,

8

relief of debt and an agreement to hold DSI harmless. The net payment to DSI was
$1,300,000 after the deduction of attorneys' fees and costs.
29.

The money from DSI's net settlement was used primarily for the purchase of

a Mercedes 600SL and the construction of a large residence in Summit County, known as
the Bear Hollow property. These expenditures were primarily for the benefit of respondent.
The settlement funds were not used to retire DSI's substantial outstanding debt.
30.

With regard to the Kodiak property, its value is now negative, and the Court

is unaware of its value, if any, now.
31.

Respondent has an interest in Omega Oil. From the testimony it is not clear

whether this interest is a 10% interest in stock or an option to acquire 10% of the stock .
Respondent is the president of Omega Oil and from Omega Oil receives a monthly income
of $6,000 since June of 1996. Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court is
unable to set a value on respondent's interest in Omega Oil.
32.

Respondent is the title owner of property in Summit County known as the

Bear Hollow property located at 2525 Bear Hollow Drive, Park City, Utah, which is more
particularly described as:
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of
the Summit County Recorder.
The value of this property is in question. There has been testimony of from $2,000,000 to
$1,500,000. Against this property there is a primary trust deed obligation of $500,000 and
a second trust deed obligation of $250,000. In addition, there is a $958,000 mechanic's

9

lien which has been filed by DSI and which currently is in litigation. The parties' equity
interest in the Bear Hollow house, therefore, currently is in litigation in Summit County,
Utah.
33.

The Court finds the home at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah,

has a value of $345,000, subject to a first mortgage obligation of $236,000 and an
attorney's lien from Louise Knauer, petitioner's prior attorney, of $10,000, resulting in a
remaining equity of $109,000.
34.

The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his corporations by taking

funds through loans and not as income with these withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not
a traditional method of compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he
has seen fit.
35.

The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of these businesses to

meet his own living expenses and to purchase property for his own interest. The Mercedes
600SL is an example.
36.

The Court finds that historically respondent has had an income in excess of

$10,000 a month with funds received from the Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 from
DSI. Currently respondent receives a salary of $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as income from his
various businesses. Consistent with his past manipulations, respondent currently has
manipulated his income to limit his income presented in this proceeding.
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37.

The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above coincide with the

amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet ongoing family expenses, both prior to the
entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, and since that time.
38.

The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to produce income

at the amount of $10,0(30 a month and finds that his income is in this amount.
39.

Petitioner has sought and obtained employment and currently has the ability

to earn an income on an hourly rate of $8.71 per hour in the gross amount of $1,498 a
month on a full-time basis. This amount would be subject to taxes. She is capable of
working full time, but is working on a part-time basis by choice.
40.

The gross income of the parties exceeds the child support guideline.

41.

The Court finds that each of the parties have incurred attorneys' fees in this

action. The Court further finds that there has been certain obstreperous conduct on the
part of respondent with respect to discovery, making it difficult to process and prosecute
this action. The Court further finds that respondent has a substantial ability to earn an
income.
42.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the

Court heard testimony from Louise Knauer and finds that those fees were necessarily
incurred. The work performed was reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this
action. The Court further finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees.
The attorney's fees petitioner incurred for the services of Louise Knauer in the amount of
$10,951 were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
11

43.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark

A. Larsen, the Court finds that substantial work was performed, that a large amount of this
work was necessary to prosecute this case to a conclusion through trial. The Court further
finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. The request for attorney's
fees of Dart and Larsen is the amount of $46,574.95, as reflected in Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16.
The Court finds that this is excessive, that these are two well-qualified lawyers, either of
whom could have individually tried the case without the need of the other. Under all the
facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds that the reasonable amount for the
attorneys' fees incurred by these attorneys for their reasonable and necessary services is
the sum of $25,000 forwhich respondent should be responsible to petitioner.
Based upon the preceding findings of fact, the Court enters the following
conclusions of law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner has failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

2.

There was a common law marriage entered into by the parties by reason of

their ongoing relationship. This common law marriage commenced immediately following
the entry of the Decree of Divorce on the 18th day of July, 1994, and will terminate at such
time as the Decree of Divorce enters in this case.
3.

The parties have now been separated since June 1996, the differences

between them are irreconcilable and petitioner is entitled to a divorce from respondent on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
12

4.

In June of 1996, respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing

relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial
change of circumstances.
5.

Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and,

further, based upon the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award:
a.

Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real property
at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to petitioner
assuming its outstanding indebtedness.

b.

Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein.

c.

Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear Hollow
property, and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity in the Bear
Hollow property, subject to outstanding liens against it. The property is more
particularly described as:
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of
the Summit County Recorder.
Respondent is ordered to pay all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes
on the Bear Hollow house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain
an independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear Hollow
property. The property is currently listed for sale and should continue to be
listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms that the property is to
13

be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of the appraised value. Each
party shall be apprised of any offers and have the right of open
communication with the listing realtor. If any other offers are received which
one party desires to accept and the other party does not desire to accept,
then the party desiring to accept the offer shall have the right to come before
the Court to request that the property be sold for this offer and the Court will
then make a determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms,
d.

Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska, subject

to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property is more particularly described
as follows:
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State
of Alaska, which lies within the following described
property:
That portion of United States Survey Number 559,
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third
Judicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this
description;
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet;
14

Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet;
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet;
Thence S 45 degrees 50' W, a distance of 138.00 feet,
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
e.

Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil.

f.

Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession, including

furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the Mercedes 600SL.
g.

Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it is in the
possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34, these items are
as follows:
(1) The floor standing globe.
(2) The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever occurs first.
Petitioner shall have the responsibility of maintaining the piano and
having it tuned annually.
(3). One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be divided
under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List "A" and a List
"B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then have the choice of which
list of tools he desires and will be awarded those tools. Petitioner will
be awarded the rest.
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6.

With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner should assume and

pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995 South Maple
Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all other liabilities
and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any liabilities in
connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil.
7.

The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody

of the minor children of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation,
which right of visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under
the Minimum Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The
respondent shall have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child
support. During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an
emergency. Visitation should be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give
the petitioner at least 24 hours' notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation.
Respondent should have such other extended visitation as agreeable
to the parties mutually.
8.

The Court finds that respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support,

taking into consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a
month and this award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998.
So long as respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the
children as a deduction'for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children
16

as a deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry
forward as reflected on his income tax returns.
9.

As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and

accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for twothirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor
children of the parties.
10.

Based upon the financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds that

petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses, exclusive of liability for income taxes is the sum
of $5,000 a month. Respondent has detailed expenses of $10,500 a month, a substantial
portion of which relates to the Bear Hollow home, which is currently listed for sale and
which it is anticipated will be sold in the near future.
11.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds

that respondent shall pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a month and petitioner
is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of December, 1998.
Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the parties from 1980 to
1996, should be for the period of 16 years or until such time as petitioner remarries,
cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment should commence with
the month of December, 1998.
12.

The Court further finds that the alimony and child support in the combined

amount of $5,000 is an amount which petitioner should receive from respondent retroactive
to the date of the first Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent
17

shall receive credit for any payments which he has made against this obligation, which
payments will be applied pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to
child support and 3/5 to be applied to alimony. The Court finds that from the entry of the
Temporary Order through the month of February, 1999, based on this calculation and
reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages which shall be reduced to judgment
in the amount of $93,586.00. These arrearages do not give credit to respondent for a
claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home in December, 1996, in the
amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment, then it would constitute
a reduction against the above balance.
The Court finds that the arrearages reflected above are for alimony
and child support with $37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as
arrearages in alimony.
13.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the

Court awards attorneys' fees to petitioner in the form of a judgment for the services of
Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951.
14.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark

A. Larsen, the Court awards petitioner a judgment for the amount of $25,000 attorneys'
fees.
15.

The award of attorneys' fees shall be reduced to judgment with the judgment

for the past-due support.

18

16.

Petitioner is further awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of

$2,890.76 as reflected on Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16.
17.

The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and

alimony and for attorneys' fees should be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's
interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest
in the Bear Hollow property.
Dated this ^ f l ^ d a v of

1999.

*LJIJ

BY THE COURT:

Rodney ^ p a g e , District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

&^_fo~t*—ELLEN M A Y ( 2 O £ K
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the _/

day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing

to:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Respondent
50 West Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Benard, Esq.
523 Heritage Blvd., #1
Layton, UT 84041

;
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DARTADAMSON DONOVAN & HANSON
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-6383
MARK A. LARSEN (3727)
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
50 West Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—000OOO000—

SONIAKELLEY,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

WAYNE KELLEY,

Civil No. 944700827DA

Respondent.

Judge Rodney S. Page
—000OOQ000—

The above-entitled consolidated matters came on regularly for trial on the 3rd and
4th days of December, 1998, petitioner appearing in person and by her attorneys, B. L. Dart
and Mark A. Larsen, respondent appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock
and the Court having heard testimony from witnesses and having received various
documentary evidence and the matter having been argued and submitted and the Court
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Petitioner claim of fraud is dismissed.

2.

The parties are married common law.

3.

Petitioner is awarded a divorce from respondent on the grounds of

irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and entry.
4.

In June of 1996,

respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing

relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial
change of circumstances.
5.

Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and,

further, based upon the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award of property.
a.

Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real
property at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to
petitioner assuming its outstanding indebtedness.

b.

Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein.

c.

Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear
Hollow property and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity
in the Bear Hollow property, subject to outstanding liens against it.
The property is more particularly described as:
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to
the official plat thereof, recorded in the official
records of the Summit County Recorder.

The value of this property is in question. Respondent is ordered to pay
all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes on the Bear Hollow
house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain an
independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear
Hollow property. The property is currently listed for sale and should
continue to be listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms
that the property is to be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of
the appraised value. Each party shall be apprised of any offers and
have the right of open communication with the listing realtor. If any
other offers are received which one party desires to accept and the
other party does not desire to accept, then the party desiring to accept
the offer shall have the right to come before the Court to request that
the property be sold for this offer and the Court will then make a
determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms.
d.

Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska,
subject to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property

is more particularly described as follows:
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State
of Alaska, which lies within the following described
property:
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That portion of United States Survey Number 559,
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third
Judicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this
description;
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet;
Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet;
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet;
Thence S 45 degrees 50' W, a distance of 138.00 feet,
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
e.

Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil.

f.

Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession,
including furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the
Mercedes 600SL.

g.

Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it
is in the possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34,
these items are as follows:
(1)

The floor standing globe.

(2)

The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever
4

occurs first.

Petitioner shall have the responsibility of

maintaining the piano and having it tuned annually.
(3)

One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be
divided under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List
"A" and a List "B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then
have the choice of which list of tools he desires and will be
awarded those tools. Petitioner will be awarded the rest.

6.

With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner is ordered to

assume and pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995
South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all
other liabilities and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any
liabilities in connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil.
7.

Petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody of the minor children

of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation, which right of
visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under the Minimum
Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The respondent shall
have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child support.
During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an
emergency. Visitation shall be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give
the petitioner at least 24 hours notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation.
5

Respondent shall have such other extended visitation as agreeable to the
parties mutually.
8.

Respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support, taking into

consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a month and this
award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998. So long as
respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the children
as a deduction for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children as a
deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry
forward as reflected on his income tax returns.
9.

As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and

accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for twothirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor
children of the parties.
10.

Respondent is ordered to pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a

month and petitioner is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of
December, 1998. Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the
parties from 1980 to 1996, shall be for the period of 16 years or until such time as
petitioner remarries, cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment
shall commence with the month of December, 1998.
11.

The alimony and child support in the combined amount of $5,000 is an

amount which petitioner shall receive from respondent retroactive to the date of the first

6

Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent shall receive credit for
any payments which he has made against this obligation, which payments shall be applied
pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to child support and 3/5 to be
applied to alimony. From the entry of the Temporary Order through the month of February,
1999, based on this calculation and reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages
which shall be reduced to judgment in the amount of $93,586. These arrearages do not
give credit to respondent for a claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home
in December, 1996, in the amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment
then it would constitute a reduction against the above balance.
The arrearages reflected above are for alimony and child support with
$37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as arrearages in alimony.
12.

Petitioner is awarded attorneys' fees in the form of a judgment for the

services of Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951.
13.

Petitioner is awarded attorney fees in the form of a judgment for the services

of B. L. Dart and Mark A. Larsen, in the amount of $25,000 attorneys' fees.
14.

The award of attorneys' fees shaH be reduced to judgment with the judgment

for the past-due support.
15.

Petitioner is awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of

$2,890.76.
16.

The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and

alimony and for attorneys' fees shall be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's
7

interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest
in the Bear Hollow property.
Dated this

z o ^ d a y of

^kJLu

1999.
BY THE COURT:

AM

Rodney S. flage, District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ELLEN MAYqgCK
Attorney for Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
hereby certify that on the J__ day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing
to:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Respondent
50 West Broadway, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Benard, Esq.
523 Heritage Blvd., #1
Layton, UT 84041
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—000OOO000—

SONIA KELLEY,
Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT
RE: CONTEMPT

:

Civil No. 944700827DA

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

v.
WAYNE KELLEY,
Respondent.

—000OOO000—

Petitioner's Motion for Contempt came on regularly for hearing on Friday, the
25th day of June, 1999, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., petitioner appearing in person and by her
attorney, B. L. Dart and respondent appearing by telephone and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock
and the Court having heard testimony from both of the parties, having heard arguments of
counsel and having reviewed the file in this case and being fully advised, hereby finds as follows
by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

The Court finds that respondent was aware of the Court's Order relative to

child support and alimony.
2.

The Court finds that respondent has failed to pay any alimony since the

divorce was granted and the Order was entered, which was to begin in December, 1998.

3.

The Court further finds that at the trial the Court found that respondent had

the ability to earn at least $10,000 a month from various sources.
4.

The Court finds that historically respondent has lived far beyond that kind

of income. Therefore, the Court finds that the $10,000 a month is a minimum and that he has the
ability to make that kind of income if he chooses to so direct his activities. The Court finds that
respondent has voluntarily chosen to stay with Omega Oil in which he has an interest and thereby
reduce his income from the possibility of greater income. The Court finds respondent has done
that to the detriment of the petitioner in this action and the children in the sense that he has failed
to pay debts and obligations which he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce, namely
the sums owing to Seattle First National Bank d/b/a SeaFirst Bank and Citibank, and as a result
they have now brought actions against the petitioner.
5.

The Court finds that respondent has the ability to generate sufficient

income to meet these obligations which he was ordered to pay under the ruling made by the
Court in December, 1998, but has failed and refused to do so.
6.

Respondent continues to live a lifestyle which allows him to take the

children to Africa, even though he claims he would have someone else pay the costs. This is
typical of the kinds of things he has done in the past.
7.

The Court finds that based upon clear and convincing evidence respondent

is in contempt of the Order of this Court by reason of his failure to pay the debts and obligations
as ordered by the Court and for his failure to pay child support and alimony as ordered by the
Court.

2

8.

The Court sentences respondent to 30 days in the Davis County Jail and a

fine of $299 with the sentence to be stayed if respondent forthwith brings current the obligations
to Citibank and SeaFirst Bank or takes care of the lawsuits that have been filed against petitioner
and relieves the pressure on petitioner and, further, that he forthwith begin to make the full
$5,000 per month for child support and alimony. Those payments should begin in the month of
June, 1999 and continue to be kept current in future months.
Forthwith means performance by the 31st day of July, 1999.
9.

Petitioner is awarded reasonable attorney's fees for her attorney to be

established by Affidavit from petitioner's attorney with respondent to have five days to file a
response.
DATED this 3tf^ day of

S l L

1999.

BY THE COURT:

RODNEY S J P A G E
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ELLEN MAY^pCK
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 22, 1999,1 caused to be delivered to the following individual
(s) the foregoing document via U.S. Mail:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Respondent
50 West Broadway, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Benard, Esq.
523 Heritage Blvd., #1
Layton, UT 84041
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Attorney for Petitioner
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801)521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOOOooo—
SONIAKELLEY,

:

Petitioner,

:

ORDER FOR CONTEMPT AND
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

v.

:

WAYNE KELLEY,

:

Civil No. 944700827DA

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

Respondent.

—oooOOOooo—
Petitioner's request that respondent be found in contempt of court and
respondent's Motion for credit for payment of debts against alimony and support obligations,
came on regularly for hearing on Friday, the 25th day of June, 1999, petitioner appearing in
person and by her attorney, B.L. Dart and respondent appearing by telephone connection
pursuant to his request and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock and the Court having taken testimony
and heard the arguments of counsel and read the various motions and supporting documentation
and having reviewed the prior orders in this case and having made and entered its Findings of
Fact hereby orders as follows:
1.

Based upon the Findings of Fact the Court finds respondent in contempt of

court for his failure to pay the debts and obligations as ordered by the Court and for his failure to

pay his child support and alimony obligations in a timely manner as ordered by the Court and
hereby sentences respondent to serve 30 days in the Davis County Jail and to pay a fine in the
sum of $299. Respondent can stay the imposition of this sentence by performing the following
acts:
a.

Forthwith brings current the obligation to Seattle First National

Bank d/b/a SeaFirst Bank, filed in the Third District Court for Summit County, Civil No.
990600164 or takes care of this lawsuit and relieves the pressure on petitioner.
b.

Forthwith brings current the obligation to Citibank in the District

Court of Davis County, Civil No. 990800256 or takes care of this lawsuit and relieves the
pressure on petitioner.
c.

Forthwith paying to petitioner the remaining unpaid portion of

child support and alimony for the month of June, 1999, of $3,000.
d.

Payment of each future month's child support and alimony on a

timely basis.
Forthwith means performance by the 31st day of July, 1999.
2.

During the pendency of this action respondent paid payments of $3,518.10

to Seattle First National Bank and $3,222.48 to USAA Federal Savings Bank. Respondent has
requested that these payments be treated as credits against his obligation for child support and
alimony arrearages. The Court has reviewed respondent's Affidavit and petitioner's Response
Affidavit and Reply. The Court has also checked the previous Orders of this Court. The record
reflects that these obligations were the obligations of respondent. The record further reflects that
these payments were made from the sale of a marital asset. The Court denies respondent's
2

request that these be applied as a credit against respondent's alimony and child support
arrearages.
3.

During argument respondent's counsel moved the Court for an Order that

all payments previously made by respondent against the Court's order for child support jnd
alimony be applied solely to child support. This Motion is denied. The Court orders that all
payments heretofore made on prior Orders and to be made on future Orders are to be applied pro
rata to alimony and child support. Based on the current Order of I he ( ourt at $5,000 a month
consisting of alimony in the sum of $3,000 and child support in the sum of $2,000. Payments
shall be applied 3/5 to alimony and 2/5 to child support.
4.

Petitioner is awarded her reasonable attorney's fees for the Motion for

Contempt and appearance on other Motions and is directed to provide an Affidavit from her
attorney reflecting these fees. Respondent will have five days to respond to this Affidavit.
DATED this

3 0 ^ day of

J j L

1999.

BY THE COURT:

(AJA A A I /

RODNEY &JPAGE
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

P
ELLEN MAYJZOCK
Attorney forRespondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the / y-f

day of July, 1999,1 mailed a copy of the

foregoing to:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Respondent
50 West Broadway, #800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Benard, Esq.
523 Heritage Blvd., #1
Layton,UT 84041
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